The Jury Vetting Cases: New Insights on Jury Trials in Criminal Cases? by MacDonnell, Vanessa




Volume 63 (2013) Article 17
The Jury Vetting Cases: New Insights on Jury Trials
in Criminal Cases?
Vanessa MacDonnell
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
MacDonnell, Vanessa. "The Jury Vetting Cases: New Insights on Jury Trials in Criminal Cases?." The Supreme Court Law Review:




The Jury Vetting Cases: New Insights 
on Jury Trials in Criminal Cases? 
Vanessa MacDonnell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada delivered its 
reasons for judgment in the jury vetting cases of R. v. Yumnu,1 R. v. Emms2 
and R. v. Davey.3 In each case, the Crown requested and received 
material “on the suitability of prospective jurors”4 from the police. 
In Yumnu and Emms, the Crown also requested criminal record checks, 
which the police completed. When the parties expressed concern about 
this vetting in the Court of Appeal, the Court concluded in all three cases 
that it was not an attempt to undermine the impartiality of the jury.5 
It also held that there was no “reasonable possibility”6 that the Crown’s 
actions had affected the make-up of the jury.7 These findings played a 
significant role in the Supreme Court’s disposition of the appeals.  
                                                                                                             
* Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa Faculty of Law (Common Law Section). Thank 
you to Leo Russomanno, the participants in the 2012 Constitutional Cases Conference, the 
participants in the 2013 University of Ottawa Women’s Writing Retreat, the editors and the 
reviewers for very helpful comments and suggestions. Thank you to Brittany Murphy for research 
assistance, made possible by the Foundation for Legal Research. 
1 [2012] S.C.J. No. 73, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 777 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Yumnu”].  
2 [2012] S.C.J. No. 74, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 810 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Emms”]. 
3 [2012] S.C.J. No. 75, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 828 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Davey”]. In fact, there were 
five cases. Yumnu’s appeal was heard along with the appeals of two co-accused, Cardoso and Duong. 
4 Id., at para. 12. I will refer to the “suitability of prospective jurors” or “potential jurors” 
throughout. 
5 This conclusion is explicit in the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decisions in Yumnu and 
Davey, and implicit in its decision in Emms, though there is no doubt that this is Moldaver J.’s 
conclusion in the Supreme Court. See Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 34, citing R. v. Yumnu, [2010] 
O.J. No. 4163, 260 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at para. 95 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Yumnu CA”]; Davey, id., 
at para. 23; R. v. Emms, [2010] O.J. No. 5195, 104 O.R. (3d) 201, at para. 61 (Ont. C.A.); Emms, 
supra, note 2, at para. 49.  
6 Yumnu, id., at para. 75. 
7 Id., at para. 8; Emms, supra, note 2, at para. 17; Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 21. 
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In three unanimous opinions, the Supreme Court explained that the 
Crown could request a criminal record check “on potential jurors to de-
termine whether they are eligible to serve as jurors”,8 but that any 
criminal record would have to be disclosed to the defence. If the police 
received additional material from this process suggesting that a juror 
might be ineligible or “partial”,9 the Crown could rely upon it, but again 
it would need to be disclosed.10 The Court also held that the Crown could 
only discuss matters of jury selection with officers working on the case 
(rather than with the police more broadly), and that it would have to dis-
close any relevant material received from those officers.11 The Court 
went on to conclude that the Crown need not disclose “opinions”,12 
“general impressions, personal or public knowledge in the community, 
rumours or hunches”.13 
While the Supreme Court’s ruling goes a long way toward eliminat-
ing the concerns associated with jury vetting, there is a disconnect 
between the Court’s description of the jury selection process and how 
counsel tend to think about jury selection in criminal trials.14 While 
counsel are limited in their ability to influence the jury selection process, 
the Court might nevertheless have considered whether a full ban on jury 
vetting was needed to combat the risk — both real and perceived15 — 
that the Crown might act unethically during the jury selection process.16 
In my view, the provincial government would do well to vest sole author-
ity for conducting criminal record checks in the provincial authorities 
tasked with creating jury panels.17 
                                                                                                             
8 Yumnu, id., at para. 50. 
9 Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 10. I will refer to “partial”, “partiality” and “partial to the 
Crown” throughout. 
10 Yumnu, supra, note 1, at paras. 53-54. 
11 Davey, supra, note 3, at paras. 34, 38, 40-42. 
12 Id., at para. 48. 
13 Id., at para. 46. 
14 For a sampling of these views, see David Paciocco et al., Jury Selection in Criminal 
Trials: Skills, Science, and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1997) [hereinafter “Paciocco et al.”].  
15 Tim Quigley, “Have We Seen the End of Improper Jury Vetting?” (2013) 98 C.R. (6th) 
109, at 112 [hereinafter “Quigley”]. 
16 R. v. Bain, [1992] S.C.J. No. 3, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bain”]; 
Quigley, id., at 112.  
17 Factum of the Criminal Lawyers Association in R. v. Emms, R. v. Yumnu et al. and R. v. 
Davey, at para. 13 [hereinafter “Criminal Lawyers Association Factum”]. For similar proposals, see 
Quigley, id., at 111; Ann Cavoukian, Excessive Background Checks Conducted on Prospective 
Jurors: A Special Investigation Report (Toronto: Information and Privacy Commissioner, 2009), at 
142-43 [hereinafter “Cavoukian, Excessive Background Checks”]. 
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Beyond their immediate usefulness in deciding the issues before 
the Court, Yumnu, Emms and Davey also raise interesting questions about 
the essential and inalienable features of jury trials in criminal cases. 
These questions arise against the backdrop of a web of Charter18 
protections, including the section 7 right to disclosure; the section 11(d) 
right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial decision-maker; 
the section 11(f) right to trial by jury; and the section 15 right to 
equality.19 One of the anomalies in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in 
relation to juries and jury selection is its near absence of engagement 
with the right to trial by jury. This leaves some doubt as to whether the 
right to trial by jury consists of anything more than the bare right to be 
tried by a jury if charged with a certain category of offence.20 While the 
Court does not invoke the right to trial by jury in Yumnu, Emms or 
Davey, its statements about the essential features of jury trials in criminal 
cases renew questions about the precise contours of the right.  
In Part II of this article, I review the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Yumnu, Emms and Davey. In Part III, I suggest that despite the 
disconnect between the way the Court describes counsel’s “role in the 
jury selection process”21 and the way that some lawyers approach jury 
selection, the Court’s decisions, if respected, largely address the possibility 
of unethical Crown conduct by jury vetting. In Part IV, I discuss the largely 
under-theorized right to trial by jury, and in Part V, I conclude.  
                                                                                                             
18 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
19 See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson 
Reuters, 2010) [hereinafter “Stuart”]; Factum of the Intervener David Asper Centre for 
Constitutional Rights in R. v. Kokopenace, 2013 ONCA 389 and R. v. Spiers, 2012 ONCA 798 
[hereinafter “Asper Centre Factum”]. See also Cynthia Petersen, “Institutionalized Racism: The 
Need for Reform of the Criminal Jury Selection Process” (1992-1993) 38 McGill L.J. 147 
[hereinafter “Petersen”]. 
20 Stuart, id., at 455. Section 11(f) of the Charter states: “Any person charged with an offence 
has the right ... (f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military tribunal, to 
the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five 
years or a more severe punishment.” The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 also provides an 
entitlement to — and sometimes effectively mandates — a jury trial: see ss. 471, 473, 565(2) and 568, 
cited in Peter Sankoff, “Rewriting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Four Suggestions 
Designed to Promote a Fairer Trial and Evidentiary Process” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 349, at 361-62 
[hereinafter “Sankoff”]. See also Benjamin L. Berger, “Peine Forte et Dure: Compelled Jury Trials 
and Legal Rights in Canada” (2003) 48 Crim. L.Q. 1 [hereinafter “Berger”]; R. v. Turpin, [1989] 
S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Turpin”].  
21 Bain, supra, note 16, at 116, per Gonthier J., dissenting. I will refer to counsel’s “role in 
the jury selection process” throughout. 
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II. THE CASES 
1. Yumnu  
In Yumnu, three co-accused were tried and convicted of second de-
gree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.22 Following oral 
argument on appeal, it emerged that the police had vetted potential jurors 
prior to the jury being selected.23 Specifically, the Crown had forwarded 
the jury panel lists to the police and requested that they indicate if poten-
tial jurors had a criminal record or were otherwise “disreputable persons 
we would not want as a juror [sic]”.24 The police complied with the re-
quest, and provided the Crown with the result of the criminal record 
checks as well as other material collected in the process.25  
The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that “the purpose of the po-
lice inquiries was to determine whether a prospective juror had a 
criminal record”26 (which would be relevant to his or her eligibility for 
jury duty), and that there was no ill motive on the part of the Crown or 
the police in conducting the vetting.27 The Court also concluded that the 
Crown’s actions “had no impact on the composition of the jury”28 and 
that the Crown and the police’s actions did not render the trial unfair or 
“bring the administration of justice into disrepute”.29 The Supreme Court 
affirmed these conclusions.  
Writing for the Court, Moldaver J. noted that jury vetting was “risky 
business”,30 a course of conduct that could not only render trials unfair 
but that could also impact upon the “integrity of the criminal justice sys-
tem”.31 Despite this, he concluded that some jury vetting could continue. 
The Crown could request criminal record checks from police due to 
shortcomings in the existing system of relying on individual jurors to 
remove themselves if they were not eligible for jury duty because of a 
prior criminal conviction.32 In addition, while the police were not entitled 
                                                                                                             
22 Yumnu, supra, note 1, at paras. 1, 19. 
23 Id., at para. 4. 
24 Id., at para. 21. 
25 Id., at para. 25. 
26 Yumnu CA, supra, note 5, at para. 94, cited in Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 34. 
27 Yumnu, id., at para. 82. 
28 Id., at para. 88. 
29 Id., at para. 37. 
30 Id., at para. 36. 
31 Id., at paras. 37, 38. 
32 Id., at paras. 48-50. 
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to seek out additional facts about potential jurors, material that came to 
the police’s attention through the process of completing a criminal record 
check could be passed on to the Crown, who could make use of it as 
needed during the jury selection process.33 All such material, Moldaver J. 
held, would also be required to be disclosed.34  
Justice Moldaver then made two observations about the existing 
process of conducting criminal record checks. He noted that because the 
Crown knows little more than the name and profession of potential ju-
rors, the police are often required to consult more than one source to be 
able to say with sufficient certainty whether an individual has a criminal 
record.35 As he explains: 
[T]he more databases accessed, the more likely it is that the authorities 
will come upon information that goes beyond a particular province’s 
eligibility criteria as it relates to prior or ongoing criminal activity, or 
the criteria needed to bring a challenge for cause under s. 638(1)(c) of 
the Code.36 
If the government provided the Crown with more data about potential 
jurors, the police would need to consult fewer sources.37 This would 
mean that there would be less chance that a criminal record check would 
“inadvertently”38 turn up other material about potential jurors.39 Justice 
Moldaver also noted that the Provincial Jury Centre, which assembles 
jury panels and serves as a stand-in for sheriffs for the purposes of the 
Juries Act,40 has jurisdiction under section 18.2 of the Juries Act to 
“request that a criminal record check, prepared from national data on the 
Canadian Police Information Centre database, be conducted” for the 
purpose of determining juror eligibility.41 The Provincial Jury Centre’s 
current practice is to conduct spot checks involving approximately  
                                                                                                             
33 Id., at paras. 53-54. 
34 Id., at paras. 51, 55. 
35 Id., at paras. 56-57. 
36 Id., at para. 58.  
37 Id., at paras. 56, 59. 
38 Id., at para. 53. 
39 Id., at paras. 58-59. 
40 R.S.O. 1990, c. J.3. 
41 Id., s. 18.2(1). See also Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 60. This provision was added in 
2009 following the release of a report by the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner on jury 
vetting which “recommended [that] the Provincial Jury Centre … be the only agency entitled to 
access criminal records databases”: Marie Comiskey, “Does Voir Dire Serve as a Powerful 
Disinfectant or Pollutant? A Look at the Disparate Approaches to Jury Selection in the United States 
and Canada” (2011) 59 Duke L. Rev. 733, at 750-51 [hereinafter “Comiskey”]. 
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10 per cent of the jury panel.42 While Moldaver J. could be read as 
implying that the Provincial Jury Centre could assume full responsibility 
for completing criminal record checks of potential jurors, he also noted 
that not all provincial juries legislation confers this authority on the body 
that assembles jury panel lists.43  
Turning to the issue of disclosure, Moldaver J. noted that while the 
Crown is required to disclose “information received by the Crown that is 
relevant to the jury selection process”,44 it need not disclose material related 
to “the prospective juror’s general reputation in the community … feelings, 
hunches, suspicions, innuendo, or other such amorphous information”.45 
While he declined to deal fully with the issue of whether the defence was 
also required to make disclosure in similar circumstances, Moldaver J. 
noted that defence counsel would be required to advise the court and the 
Crown if counsel had “good reason to believe that a potential juror has 
engaged in criminal conduct that renders him or her ineligible for jury 
duty”46 or if there was “good reason to believe that a potential juror cannot 
serve on a particular case due to matters of obvious partiality”.47  
Finally, Moldaver J. made a series of general comments about the 
Crown and the defence’s role in jury selection and about the function of the 
jury.48 After noting that “[t]he process is not governed by the strictures of the 
adversarial model, nor should it be”,49 Moldaver J. went on to articulate four 
basic features of the jury: eligibility, impartiality, representativeness and 
competence.50 He noted that impartiality was constitutionally mandated, and 
that jury selection should be approached with the objective of ensuring that 
the accused receives a trial consistent with the section 11(d) right to a fair 
trial by an independent and impartial decision-maker.51  
Justice Moldaver then applied a “modified”52 version of the 
Dixon/Taillefer53 test to determine whether the Crown’s failure to disclose 
                                                                                                             
42 Yumnu, id., at para. 61. 
43 Id. 
44 Id., at para. 51. 
45 Id., at para. 64. 
46 Id., at para. 66. 
47 Id., at para. 67. 
48 Id., at paras. 70-72. 
49 Id., at para. 71. 
50 Id. 
51 Id., at para. 72. 
52 Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 56. I will refer to the test as “modified” throughout. 
53 R. v. Dixon, [1998] S.C.J. No. 17, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dixon”]; 
R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.J. No. 75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taillefer”]. 
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the material in its possession about potential jurors warranted a new trial. 
He expressed the relevant legal standard as follows:  
[P]ersons who seek a new trial on the basis that such non-disclosure 
deprived them of their right to a fair trial under s. 7 of the Charter 
must, at a minimum, establish that: (1) the Crown failed to disclose 
information relevant to the selection process that it was obliged to 
disclose; and (2) had the requisite disclosure been made, there is a 
reasonable possibility that the jury would have been differently 
constituted.54  
Focusing his analysis on the second requirement, Moldaver J. affirmed 
the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the accused could not show that the 
jury would have been “differently constituted” but for the Crown’s fail-
ure to provide the material in its possession to the defence.55  
Justice Moldaver also dealt with the question of whether the jury 
vetting in this case occasioned a miscarriage of justice.56 He emphasized 
that the Court of Appeal had concluded that “[t]here was no attempt on 
the part of the police or the Crown to uncover information about 
prospective jurors in an effort to obtain a favourable jury”.57 He added 
that the Rules of Professional Conduct contemplated that the Crown 
might undertake some form of vetting of potential jurors,58 and that the 
Crown had acted “in good faith”.59 Taking these factors into account, as 
well as the fact that the Crown’s actions “had no impact on the 
composition of the jury … the outcome of the trial or the overall fairness 
of the trial process”,60 Moldaver J. concluded that there had been no 
miscarriage of justice.  
2. Emms 
In Emms, the Court applied the legal principles articulated in 
Yumnu and reached a similar result.61 Emms was charged with multiple 
counts of fraud. When the Crown received the jury panel lists, it 
forwarded those lists to the police and requested that the police 
                                                                                                             
54 Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 75. 
55 Id., at para. 77. 
56 Id., at para. 79. 
57 Id., at para. 82.  
58 Id., at para. 82. 
59 Id., at para. 83. 
60 Id., at para. 88. 
61 Emms, supra, note 2, at para. 5. 
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complete criminal record checks. As in Yumnu, the Crown indicated 
that “[i]t would also be helpful if comments could be made concerning 
any disreputable persons we would not want as a juror [sic]”.62 Emms’ 
trial post-dated the release of a Practice Memorandum by the Ontario 
Ministry of the Attorney General placing significant constraints on jury 
vetting by the Crown.63 The Practice Memorandum stated that jury 
vetting should not extend beyond completing criminal record checks. 
It also directed that the results of these checks should be shared with 
the defence.64 Despite the issuance of the Practice Memorandum, the 
Crown continued to request not only that criminal record checks be 
completed, but also that the police provide material relevant to 
the suitability of potential jurors.65 In this particular case, the police 
provided the Crown with other data it had gathered in the process of 
completing the criminal record checks. It also expressed its approval or 
disapproval of individuals on the jury panel list.66 Defence counsel was not 
provided with any of this material.67  
The Court of Appeal held that while the defence used two peremp-
tory challenges that it probably would not have used but for the Crown’s 
failure to disclose the material it received from police, the resulting jury 
was impartial, and the outcome of the trial would have been the same had 
proper disclosure been made.68 Justice Moldaver affirmed these findings, 
noting that Emms had not satisfied the second branch of the modified 
Dixon/Taillefer test.69  
Justice Moldaver also rejected the argument that the actions of the 
Crown and the police had occasioned a miscarriage of justice, even 
though the case had proceeded after the Ministry of the Attorney General 
had issued the jury vetting Practice Memorandum.70 In his view, the 
Crown’s actions could not be attributed to “malevolence or intentional 
                                                                                                             
62 Id., at para. 7. 
63 Id., at para. 11. See also Quigley, supra, note 15, at 112. 
64 Emms, id., at para. 11. 
65 Id., at para. 44. 
66 Id., at paras. 8-9. 
67 Id., at para. 10. 
68 R. v. Emms, [2010] O.J. No. 5195, 104 O.R. (3d) 201, at paras. 49, 50 (Ont. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Emms CA”], cited in Emms, supra, note 2, at para. 17. 
69 See supra, note 53; Emms, id., at para. 29. 
70 Emms, id., at paras. 43-44. 
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wrongdoing”,71 nor was there anything to suggest that the Crown’s goal 
had been to craft a “favourable” jury.72  
3. Davey 
Justice Karakatsanis authored the final opinion in the trilogy. Davey 
was a high-profile murder case in which the victim was a police officer.73 
Before the jury was selected, the Crown forwarded jury panel lists to 
police detachments in the area and made a similar request for material as 
in Yumnu and Emms.74 In concluding that the Crown went too far, 
Karakatsanis J. stated that “the Crown should not have the advantage of 
the use of state resources, which are not available to the defence, to 
choose a jury that may be perceived to be favourable to the Crown”.75 
She went on to conclude, however, that the Crown was not barred from 
seeking the input of police officers who were directly involved in the 
case.76 If a police officer provided “relevant information”77 to the Crown, 
or where it was “unclear whether a bald police opinion [wa]s based upon 
such information”,78 the Crown would be required to disclose the 
material.79 Mere “opinions” did not generally need to be disclosed, 
however.80  
In reaching these conclusions, Karakatsanis J. reviewed the basic 
features of the jury in criminal cases, providing a slightly different itemi-
zation than Moldaver J. in Yumnu. She noted that juries ought to be 
“independent, impartial and competent”.81 She observed that “neither 
party has the right to select a jury, or has a positive power to shape a 
jury”,82 and that “[j]urors are selected at random, and randomness en-
sures representativeness”.83 She also emphasized that at the jury selection 
stage, the Crown and the defence have a common purpose: “[a]s officers 
                                                                                                             
71 Id., at para. 44. 
72 Id.  
73 Davey, supra, note 3, at paras. 4, 15. 
74 Id., at para. 12. 
75 Id., at para. 34. 
76 Id., at para. 9. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id., at para. 9. 
80 Id., at para. 46. 
81 Id., at para. 30.  
82 Id., at para. 31. 
83 Id. 
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of the court, all counsel have a responsibility to uphold the Charter right 
… to an independent and impartial jury”.84  
Justice Karakatsanis then applied the modified Dixon/Taillefer test 
described by Moldaver J. in Yumnu. She stated in obiter that before a 
court concluded that a new trial should be ordered in a case in which the 
modified test was satisfied, the court should first ask whether “on bal-
ance … the jury was impartial”.85 Applying the test, she concluded that 
while the Crown’s disclosure was insufficient, this did not affect the 
make-up of the jury. She also held that the accused had received a fair 
trial by an impartial jury.86 She noted that due to the high profile nature 
of the case, the Court had put many questions to potential jurors as part 
of the jury selection process, and that a large number of potential jurors 
who might have been partial were ruled out as a result.87  
Finally, Karakatsanis J. also concluded that the Crown and the 
police’s conduct did not give rise to an “appearance of unfairness” 
sufficient to constitute a miscarriage of justice.88 Justice Karakatsanis 
noted that the extensive questioning by the court during the selection 
process eliminated individuals who might have been considered pro-
police.89 She was also favourably impressed by the Crown’s decision to 
disclose both that the victim’s brother-in-law appeared on the jury panel 
list90 and that one of the jurors made a comment adverse to the accused 
before trial.91  
III. THE PROBLEM OF JURY VETTING 
The jury vetting cases raise interesting questions about counsel’s role 
in the jury selection process. Indeed, in Yumnu, Emms and Davey, the 
Court proceeded on the assumption that the police and the Crown could 
do great damage by “investigating”92 members of the jury panel. “The 
mere thought of the Crown and the police ‘checking out’ potential jurors 
carries with it the spectre of jury tampering and the evils associated with 
                                                                                                             
84 Id. 
85 Id., at para. 55. 
86 Id., at para. 10. 
87 Id., at para. 15. 
88 Id., at para. 74. 
89 Id., at para. 77. 
90 Id., at paras. 13, 78. 
91 Id., at paras. 19, 78. 
92 Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 52. I will use this language throughout. 
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it”,93 Moldaver J. warned in Yumnu. “Care must be taken to guard against 
this. The integrity of our criminal justice system hangs in the balance.” 94  
The Court’s high rhetoric is at odds with the Crown’s actual ability to 
influence the make-up of the jury through jury vetting. Before elaborat-
ing, I should say that I believe the Court was correct to remind the 
Crown of the constitutional imperatives of impartiality and full disclo-
sure. I also agree with Tim Quigley that the Court “failed to place enough 
stress on the appearance of justice” and that it should have concluded 
that miscarriages of justice had occurred.95 But the Court’s comments 
create the false impression that the Crown could have used the material it 
received from police to craft a pro-Crown jury. This is simply not the 
case. The Crown cannot “select” jurors per se; it can only exercise a per-
emptory challenge to “exclude”96 a particular juror from the jury, or 
make submissions on why a particular juror should be dismissed for 
cause.97 If no basis for a challenge for cause exists, then the Crown can 
only challenge the juror if it has peremptory challenges available to it. In 
other words, the Crown has no ability to “select” jurors whom it believes 
might favour its position. 
In addition, the constitutional (and longstanding common law) im-
perative of impartiality means that the Crown is permitted — perhaps 
even required — to exclude potential jurors who may be biased against 
the Crown.98 Thus, it cannot be assumed that excluding individuals who 
might be pro-defence involves a form of “jury tampering” — indeed, the 
opposite may well be true. If sufficient evidence of partiality exists, then 
a potential juror may be challenged for cause.99 Where the Crown sus-
pects but cannot establish partiality,100 on the other hand, it is appropriate 
for a peremptory challenge to be used. 
                                                                                                             
93 Id., at para. 38. 
94 Id. See also Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 29. 
95 Quigley, supra, note 15, at 112. See also Factum of the British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association in R. v. Emms, R. v. Yumnu et al., and R. v. Davey [hereinafter “BCCLA Factum”]. 
96 Bain, supra, note 16, at 115, per Gonthier J., dissenting on other grounds. I will use this 
term throughout. 
97 Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 31; Bain, id., at 115, per Gonthier J., dissenting on other 
grounds. 
98 See Bain, id., at 156, per Stevenson J.: “It is, indeed, proper for the Crown to use the 
process to put aside jurors who may be partial to the accused.” 
99 Id., at 153, per Stevenson J. 
100 R. v. Gayle, [2001] O.J. No. 1559, 54 O.R. (3d) 36, at para. 59 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Gayle”], citing R. v. Cloutier, [1979] S.C.J. No. 67, 48 C.C.C. (2d) 1, at 20-21 (S.C.C.); Bain, 
supra, note 16, at 152-53, per Stevenson J.; Neil Vidmar, “The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching 
for a Middle Ground” (1999) 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 141, at 158 [hereinafter “Vidmar”]. 
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What is left, then, in terms of unacceptable behaviour in which the 
Crown might engage, and is there any relationship between this behaviour 
and jury vetting? To begin, the Crown might exercise its peremptory 
challenges in a discriminatory manner.101 This compromises the 
representativeness and the impartiality of the jury.102 Discriminatory jury 
selection may or may not be based on material derived from jury vetting. 
There was no evidence in Yumnu, Emms or Davey that jury vetting 
provided the Crown with material that could have formed the basis of a 
discriminatory use of the Crown’s peremptory challenges. Post-trilogy, it 
seems unlikely that the process of completing a criminal record check 
would produce material that the Crown could use to exercise its 
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, though it should be 
noted that by their very nature, peremptory challenges require counsel to 
make stereotypical assumptions about individuals and groups. 
The Crown might also choose not to challenge a juror whom it 
believes to be partial to its case.103 It may have formed this opinion based 
on material derived from jury vetting. But the chances of the police 
coming across this kind of material during the jury vetting process have 
always been low. Post-trilogy, they approach zero. The evidence in 
these three appeals and in another prominent jury vetting case in Ontario, 
R. v. Spiers,104 suggests that jury vetting turned up a variety of material 
about potential jurors, most of it about their criminal past.105 
Occasionally the police found evidence to suggest that an individual 
frequently reported matters to the police or that he or she had been a 
“victim” or a “complainant” in an unrelated matter,106 but this evidence is 
less likely to surface now that the police may only perform criminal 
                                                                                                             
101 See, e.g., R. v. Pizzacalla, [1991] O.J. No. 2008, 5 O.R. (3d) 783 (Ont. C.A.). See also 
Gayle, id., at para. 65. Note that in Gayle, the Court dealt with the issue under s. 11(f). See also 
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102 Asper Centre Factum, supra, note 19, citing R. v. Williams, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 
1 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 48 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Williams”]; Petersen, id.  
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id., at 159, per Stevenson J., cited in Penney et al., supra, note 101, at 663: “The peremptory challenge is 
not, in itself, under attack. It may be used for partisan considerations, and so long as the right of exercise 
is proportionate neither the Crown nor the accused can be said to have an unconstitutional advantage.” 
104 [2012] O.J. No. 5450, 113 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Spiers”]. See also factum 
of appellant Clare Spiers in Spiers [hereinafter “Spiers Factum”].  
105 Yumnu, supra, note 1, at paras. 53-54. 
106 Yumnu, id., at para. 25; Spiers Factum, supra, note 104, at para. 16. 
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record checks and offer existing knowledge if they are directly 
involved in the case.  
In sum, the vast majority of this evidence could not be used by the 
Crown for any purpose other than to eliminate from the jury pool indi-
viduals who might be biased against the Crown. It is far from clear that 
there is anything preventing the Crown from drawing the inference that 
individuals who have had previous experiences with law enforcement 
might not be impartial, and challenging the individual on that basis. The 
Crown might similarly conclude that an individual who has made a com-
plaint on a previous occasion or who has been a victim might have a 
difficult time maintaining impartiality. In this context, would the Crown 
also be required to exclude the juror? 
The starting point in answering this question is that the Crown and the 
defence have an obligation to do what they can to ensure that the jury is 
impartial.107 If the Crown has reason to believe that a juror may be partial, 
either for or against the Crown, then it has an ethical obligation to exclude 
that juror. But here additional complications arise. Where there is clear 
evidence of bias, the Crown may challenge a juror for cause. In the vast 
majority of cases, however, the Crown and the defence will be making its 
decisions about whether to challenge a juror on the basis of something 
less than conclusive evidence of bias or impartiality. In many cases, the 
Crown or the defence may only have a “hunch”108 or an “instinct”109 
about the likely partiality of the witness. In these circumstances, we 
cannot confidently suggest that the Crown is in breach of its obligations if 
it fails to challenge someone whom it has a “hunch” may be biased. As a 
general rule, however, the standard for challenging a juror who might not 
be impartial should be the same regardless of whether the individual’s 
partiality favours or disadvantages the Crown. 
Occasionally, the Crown may decide not to challenge a juror whom it 
ought to challenge, either because it is not satisfied that there is enough 
evidence of partiality, or because of what the Supreme Court of Canada 
in R. v. Bain called “human frailt[y]”.110 This is why the presence of de-
fence counsel is crucial. The defence’s role in jury selection includes 
being particularly vigilant for jurors who might not be impartial but who 
                                                                                                             
107 See generally Penney et al., supra, note 101, at 439-41. 
108 Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 46. 
109 Paciocco et al., supra, note 14, at 177. 
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note 100, at para. 59.  
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the Crown has less of an incentive to challenge. Equally crucially, how-
ever, the defence can only participate effectively in jury selection if the 
Crown and the defence have “equal information about the prospective 
jurors”.111 It is unsurprising, then, that disclosure plays such a key role in 
the Court’s reasons in Yumnu, Emms and Davey. If the defence does not 
have access to the same material as the Crown, then it cannot effectively 
weed out partiality that inures to the benefit of the Crown. 
Thus, in the normal course, the Crown’s ability to “tamper” with the 
jury is limited. Post-trilogy, the Crown must disclose any relevant evi-
dence uncovered through a criminal record check or by speaking to 
police who are directly involved in the case.112 This means that in prac-
tice, the Crown and the defence should have “equal information”.113 To 
the extent that the Crown falls short of its obligation to discharge jurors 
who might be partial to the Crown, the defence is equipped with the ma-
terial it needs to challenge the juror. The result is that the Crown’s ability 
to “tamper” with the jury is greatly reduced.  
Justice Moldaver notes in Yumnu that the Provincial Jury Centre 
has the statutory authority to request that criminal record checks be 
conducted by the police on its behalf. He notes, however, that not all 
provinces have such provisions in their provincial juries legislation. In 
my view, the provincial government would do well to transfer sole 
control over criminal record checks to the Provincial Jury Centre.114 
This would eliminate the possibility that a criminal record check would 
“inadvertently”115 turn up material about potential jurors, and would 
provide further protection against the risk — real or perceived116 — that 
the Crown might not exercise its peremptory challenges ethically.117 It 
would also remove the perception of collusion between the Crown and 
                                                                                                             
111 Factum of the appellant Cardoso in R. v. Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 30 [hereinafter 
“Cardoso Factum”]. See also factum of the appellant Davey in Davey, supra, note 3, at paras. 52-53.  
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associated with peremptory challenges with his criminal procedure class, which I took in 2008.  
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the police that the Court expresses concern about in these cases.118 In 
this respect, it is interesting to note that the Court’s earlier, more 
realistic statements about the potential ethical shortcomings of the 
Crown did not find their way into these judgments, particularly in a 
case in which the Crown did not comply with its own Practice 
Direction.119 Had the Court taken note of the possible “human frailties” 
of Crown counsel (and the police), it might have been unwilling to 
sanction any jury vetting.120 
A final point: the Court does not deal in any depth with the question 
of whether the defence might also be required to disclose material rele-
vant to jury selection to the Crown, noting only that the defence must 
advise the Crown and the court if they have material suggesting that a 
potential juror is ineligible or if they “know or have good reason to be-
lieve that a potential juror cannot serve on a particular case due to 
matters of obvious partiality”.121 While the defence does not have a duty 
of disclosure in other contexts, these obligations seem obvious and un-
controversial. The accused would not be disadvantaged by such an 
obligation, given that at the jury selection stage, the Crown and the de-
fence are united in the common purpose of ensuring impartiality. In any 
event, it seems unlikely that the comparatively under-“resource[d]”122 
defence would engage in extensive vetting.  
IV. THE CONTENT OF THE SECTION 11(f) RIGHT TO  
TRIAL BY JURY 
As has been noted, the right to trial by jury has played surprisingly 
little role in the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence in relation to 
juries and jury selection, and Yumnu, Emms and Davey are no 
exception.123 One of the most extensive discussions of the right can be 
found in R. v. Turpin, a case that raised the issue of whether the right to 
trial by jury included a right not to be tried by a jury.124 By contrast, the 
Court has adverted to the right to a fair trial by an independent and 
                                                                                                             
118 Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 38; Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 34. 
119 See Quigley, supra, note 15, at 112, referring to Emms, supra, note 2. 
120 Quigley, id. 
121 Yumnu, supra, note 1, at paras. 65-67. 
122 Id., at para. 40. 
123 Stuart, supra, note 19, at 454. 
124 Turpin, supra, note 20; Stuart, id., at 459-60. For a critique of Turpin, see Berger, 
supra, note 20.  
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impartial decision-maker in a number of jury selection cases, including 
Yumnu and Davey.125  
On one level, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court failed to 
mention, much less consider, the applicability of section 11(f) of the 
Charter.126 The right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial 
decision-maker arguably encompasses most of the constitutional concerns 
that might be raised by an accused in the context of a jury trial.127 The jury 
vetting cases were not framed as section 11(f) cases, and the Court was 
clearly preoccupied with both the disclosure issues and with whether the 
jury selected was impartial within the meaning of section 11(d). In the 
only other jury vetting case to be heard by the Supreme Court since 1982, 
R. v. Latimer,128 the Court did not refer to the Charter at all, preferring 
to rest its reasoning on the “fundamental tenet of the criminal justice 
system” that “justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done”.129 Nevertheless, it is worth asking 
whether some of the essential features of the jury identified and re-
affirmed by the Court in these cases might ultimately find recognition as 
elements of the right to trial by jury, or whether the right is destined to 
remain neglected, conferring little more than the bare right to be tried by a 
jury if charged with a certain category of offence.130 
Theorizing about the jury through the lens of constitutional rights 
only gets us so far, of course. Individual rights are not the Court’s sole 
concern at the jury selection stage.131 Juries perform a “democratic” 
function,132 and this means that the process of selecting the jury has a 
                                                                                                             
125 See Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 72; Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 31. 
126 But see R. v. Parks, [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 15 O.R. (3d) 324, at para. 28 (Ont. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Parks”]: “The accused’s right to challenge for cause based on partiality is essential to 
both the constitutional right to a fair trial and the constitutional right, in cases where the accused is 
liable to five or more years’ imprisonment, to trial by jury.” 
127 Thank you to Leo Russomanno for pointing this out to me. See also Berger, supra, 
note 20, at 12.  
128 R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.). 
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132 Graham Parker, “Trial by Jury in Canada” (1987) 8 J. Legal Hist. 178; Lynn Smith, 
“Charter Equality Rights: Some General Issues and Specific Applications in British Columbia to 
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“social” dimension that is not co-extensive with the interests of either the 
accused or the Crown.133 Moreover, even the broader legal framework 
does not capture all of the factors relevant to jury selection. As Moldaver 
J. explains in Yumnu: 
[W]hile there are various rules and regulations that govern the selection 
of juries, much of what occurs is rooted in custom. The process must 
take into account the needs of the people and the special problems that 
may exist in the locale or region in which the trial is being held. 
Flexibility is essential, as is common sense, good judgment and good 
faith on the part of those who play a central role in the process.134 
That being said, the Charter does confer a right to trial by jury. To the 
extent that the accused has a right to a jury with certain features, the jury 
vetting cases might provide some insight into the content of that right.  
Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis refer to similar essential features 
of the jury — eligibility, independence, impartiality, randomness, represen-
tativeness and competence — but they do not go so far as to say that these 
features are guaranteed by section 11(f). This is consistent with the Court’s 
general reluctance to provide guidance on the content of section 11(f). 
In my view, there are two main reasons for this state of affairs. First, 
many of these features are protected by section 11(d). Second, the Court 
may be reluctant to read the right to trial by jury expansively because to 
do so would threaten the historic approach to jury selection and — by 
extension — certain accepted truths about juries.135 In at least some in-
stances, it would require courts to permit additional inquiries into 
whether the jury actually possessed the features required of it by the 
Charter. This would expand the scope of in-court vetting of potential ju-
rors beyond that currently permitted by the Criminal Code and the 
common law and would undermine the dubious but entrenched presump-
tion that jurors are impartial, competent and the like.136  
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Interestingly, this presumption is less intact in the context of the 
guarantee of a fair trial by an independent and impartial decision-
maker.137 In fact, the Court has denounced the very judicial hesitation 
that we see in the context of the right to trial by jury.138 It may be that 
because section 11(d) contains an explicit guarantee of a fair trial by an 
independent and impartial decision-maker, the Court feels that it has little 
choice but to give content to the right. In addition, the Criminal Code 
sets out a detailed scheme for challenges for cause and peremptory chal-
lenges. In other words, “Parliament itself has acknowledged that jurors 
may sometimes be unable to set aside their prejudices and act impartially 
between the Crown and the accused, despite our hope and expectation 
that they will do so”.139  
While in-court vetting of potential jurors does not raise the same 
issues as the jury vetting conducted by the Crown and the police in 
Yumnu, Emms and Davey,140 its expansion would move the Court further 
away from the existing paradigm of jury selection.141 We need not regard 
this as problematic. Courts have never taken the position that the values 
to which the jury selection process seeks to be faithful are best 
accomplished by a hands-off approach.142 Those who are concerned that 
it would unacceptably alter the jury selection process to recognize a right 
to a jury with certain features need look no further than the Court’s 
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gradual acceptance of a greater scope for questions to be put to potential 
jurors about their ability to impartially judge a case involving a racialized 
accused to see that permitting such inquiries will not fundamentally re-
orient the jury system143 or open the door to “U.S.-style jury voir dire”.144 
The Supreme Court has placed significant trust in the ability of trial 
judges to “[control] the challenge process to prevent its abuse, to ensure 
that it is fair to the prospective juror as well as to the accused, and to 
prevent the trial from becoming unnecessarily delayed by unfounded 
challenges for cause”.145 It has also rejected precisely the sorts of 
arguments that may be holding the Court back from giving constitutional 
recognition of other features of the jury.  
To provide just one example, in Davey, Karakatsanis J. re-states the 
now well-accepted principle that “randomness ensures representative-
ness”.146 This principle has been shown to be quite problematic,147 most 
recently in criminal trials and coroner’s inquests involving indigenous  
accused and deceased, respectively.148 These events led the Ontario  
Government to request an independent review of “First Nations representa-
tion on Ontario juries” by former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Frank 
Iacobucci.149 His report, delivered in February 2013, outlines serious defi-
ciencies in the representation of indigenous people on juries in the Province 
of Ontario.  
While the Supreme Court has hinted that representativeness is a  
pre-requisite to a fair trial and thus may find protection under 
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section 11(d),150 some members of the Court have expressed skepticism 
about whether representativeness should be recognized as a constitutionally 
guaranteed feature of jury trials in criminal cases. In R. v. Sherratt, the 
Supreme Court explained that “the Charter right to trial by jury is 
meaningless without some guarantee that it will perform its duties 
impartially and represent, as far as is possible and appropriate in the 
circumstances, the larger community”.151 In Williams, the Court noted 
that “a representative jury pool” was an “essential safeguard” of “the 
accused’s section 11(d) Charter right”.152 But in R. v. Biddle, McLachlin 
C.J.C., writing for herself in the context of a challenge to a jury 
comprised of 12 women, expressed doubt about whether the accused 
should be permitted to challenge the jury pool or the resulting jury on the 
ground of lack of representativeness. She stated:  
To say that a jury must be representative is to set a standard impossible 
of achievement. The community can be divided into a hundred different 
groups on the basis of variants such as gender, race, class and 
education. Must every group be represented on every jury? If not, 
which groups are to be chosen and on what grounds? If so, how much 
representation is enough? Do we demand parity based on regional 
population figures? Or will something less suffice? I see no need to 
start down this problematic path of the representative jury, provided the 
impartiality and competence of the jury are assured. Representativeness 
may be a means to achieving this end. But it should not be elevated to 
the status of an absolute requirement.153 
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With respect, McLachlin C.J.C.’s comments (in obiter) overstate the 
concerns that might arise from guaranteeing a representative jury and 
understate courts’ ability to craft a doctrine that ensures an adequate 
degree of representativeness. Courts would do well to consider 
recognizing the constitutional nature of representativeness by confirming 
that representativeness is a component of the right to trial by jury under 
section 11(f). The Court could also read sections 11(d) and 11(f) together 
to reach such a result.154 
Moreover, there is no reason to be concerned that a right to a repre-
sentative jury would bring about significant additional costs or delays in 
the trial process.155 Representativeness is usually an issue that is consid-
ered at the level of the jury panel, though challenges have also been 
brought to the make-up of the jury that is actually selected.156 In other 
words, a right to a representative jury would intrude very little, if at all, 
into the jury selection process. Indeed, many of Iacobucci J.’s recom-
mendations in his Report on First Nations Representation on Ontario 
Juries relate to the development of jury panel lists rather than the process 
to be followed at the jury selection stage.157 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Yumnu, Emms and Davey provide 
clear guidance on the extent to which the Crown may engage in jury vet-
ting. In my view, the provincial governments should vest exclusive 
authority for performing criminal record checks in the provincial jury 
authority charged with compiling jury panels. As Cory J. stated in Bain, 
“[t]he protection of basic rights should not be dependent upon a reliance 
on the continuous exemplary conduct of the Crown, something that is 
impossible to monitor and or control. Rather the offending [power] 
should be removed.”158 
                                                                                                             
Schuller & Neil Vidmar, “The Canadian Criminal Jury” (2011) 86:2 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 497, at 
501 [hereinafter “Schuller & Vidmar”].  
154 The Court of Appeal did just this in the recent decision of Kokopenace, id., at paras. 25-26, 
per LaForme J.A. 
155 For a review of these concerns, and their ultimate rejection, see Sherratt, supra, note 136. 
156 Sherratt, id., at 525; Penney et al., supra, note 101, at 640; Schuller & Vidmar, supra, 
note 153, at 501.  
157 See Iacobucci, supra, note 148. 
158 Bain, supra, note 16, at 104, per Cory J. 
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The jury vetting cases do not get us much further in terms of 
understanding the content of the right to trial by jury. I have suggested that 
some, if not all, of the essential features of the jury might properly be 
considered to be constitutionally guaranteed by section 11(f). At the very 
least, the Court ought to read sections 11(d) and 11(f) together, so that 
section 11(d) does not do all the conceptual heavy-lifting and so that the 
right to trial by jury does not become a merely vestigial right. 
 
